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WHO OWNS THE ATHLETE?: THE APPLICATION OF THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST IN THE RIGHT OF  
PUBLICITY CONTEXT 
Allison Hollows* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, college football game attendance reached nearly 49 mil-
lion people for the year.1  Seeking to capitalize on the college football 
frenzy, Electronic Arts, Inc. (“Electronic Arts”) created NCAA Football 
2006.  Already popular for its National Football League (“NFL”) simu-
lation videogames, Electronic Arts would now give the fans the oppor-
tunity to control their hometown college or alma mater’s team.2  NCAA 
Football 2006 simulates the college football experience, including stadi-
ums, mascots, and players.3  The game places the user in control of the 
team, allowing him or her to dictate the plays, decide the roster, and 
determine recruitment for his or her fantasy team’s next season.4 
Dedicated to realism and detail, NCAA Football 2006 includes 
“‘over 100 virtual teams’ . . . populated by digital avatars that resemble 
their real-life counterparts,” and share their “vital and biographical in-
formation.”5  Among the digital avatars, the Rutgers quarterback, num-
ber thirteen, is the digital twin of Ryan Hart.6  Like Hart, the avatar 
weighs 197 pounds and stands six feet two inches tall.7  Certainly such 
attention to detail fulfills Electronic Arts’ desire to simulate a realistic 
experience by letting fans control the moves of digital copies of their 
favorite teams and players.  Ryan Hart, however, argued that the vide-
ogame company went too far, taking advantage of his persona for com-
mercial gain.8  The dispute between the company and the player raises 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Muhlenberg Col-
lege.1  Bryan Curtis, The National Pastime(s), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at WK5, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/weekinreview/01curtis.html?_r=0. 
 2  See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141,146 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Hart, 717 F.3d at 147. 
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the question of when the use of a celebrity image becomes a misappro-
priation of that person’s own identity, rather than a unique creation of 
the writers and developers in the videogame world.  Central to the res-
olution of this dispute, as undertaken by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., is the rec-
onciliation of the tension between the player’s right to his identity and 
the videogame company’s right to its creative work.9 
In Hart, a case of first impression for the Third Circuit, the court 
sought to balance the interests of the Rutgers University quarterback, 
Ryan Hart, in his identity, likeness, and celebrity and the interests of 
Electronic Arts in developing and marketing a realistic college football 
videogame.10  More specifically, the court had to balance the right of 
publicity under intellectual property law that Hart claimed against 
Electronic Arts’ interest in free expression under the First Amend-
ment.11 
The First Amendment prevents the suppression of speech, while 
the right of publicity stops speech that takes advantage of another per-
son’s interest in his or her own identity.12  Accordingly, the two interests 
must be balanced so that valuable speech is not suppressed, and an 
individual’s identity is not exploited, without his or her consent.  The 
Third Circuit’s determination in Hart of the way in which the interests 
of the First Amendment and the right of publicity are balanced reflects 
an application of the transformative use test.13  The decision, therefore, 
may have far reaching implications, as this test, and the way in which it 
is applied, will be the determinative factor in future right of publicity 
cases.  Thus far, a broad range of circumstances has implicated the 
right of publicity, including: the use of Babe Ruth photographs in a 
baseball calendar;14 a play in which performers simulate the style of the 
Marx Brothers;15 a videogame character with mannerisms and spoken 
phrases similar to those of a musician;16 and the use of baseball players’ 
names and stats in a fantasy league.17  Few courts, however, have directly 
 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. at 148149. 
 11  Id at 148. 
 12  See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Prop-
erty and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
 13  Hart, 717 F.3d at 163. 
 14  Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 15  Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), rev’d on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 16  Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 17  C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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addressed the interplay between the right of publicity property interest 
and free expression.18  The balancing of the property interest and free 
expression is the same balancing of interests that copyright and trade-
mark law address.19  Accordingly, the balancing in the right of publicity 
context should mirror the balancing of the same interests in copyright 
and trademark law. 
This Comment, using Hart v. Electronic Arts as a starting point, ar-
gues that the balancing of interests undertaken in the right of publicity 
context should mirror the balancing undertaken in other areas of in-
tellectual property.  Part II discusses the development of the right of 
publicity and its clash with the First Amendment provision for freedom 
of speech.  Part II also examines the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Hart.  Part III provides a brief overview of the operative structures, 
concerns, and criticisms in copyright and trademark law and their in-
tersection with free speech and the First Amendment.  Part IV argues 
that the transformative use test should be interpreted to account for 
the common interests underlying the right of publicity, copyright, and 
trademark, particularly the commercial interests central to the discus-
sion of the right of publicity and explicit in the balancing regimes of 
copyright and trademark law.  Part V concludes. 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity protects an individual’s right to the exclu-
sive commercial use of his or her name and likeness.20  Historically 
based in the somewhat-analogous right to privacy tort, the right of pub-
licity seeks to protect an individual from exploitation of that individ-
ual’s fame or notoriety without his or her consent.21  The right origi-
nates in the tort of “invasion of privacy by appropriation,” which 
provides that an individual’s likeness, image, or identity cannot be 
used by another without authorization.22  Put differently, one party can-
not capitalize on the fame of another without his or her consent.  Es-
sentially, the right of publicity grants an individual a property interest 
in his or her own identity.23 
 
 18  See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001)  
 19  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
 20  See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 21  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 22  Id. at 150 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 
1:23 (2d ed. 2012)). 
 23  Id. (quoting Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 
1907)). 
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The application of the right of publicity is broad.24  Though tradi-
tionally exercised by celebrities, the right is available to all individuals.25  
The use of a celebrity image as a false or misleading endorsement of a 
product, for example, is a readily apparent application of the right of 
publicity because the fame and household recognition accompanying 
celebrity provides a building block upon which the creator of the new 
work or product can capitalize.26  When baseball cards carry a cartoon 
image of a famous baseball player, they are more enticing to fans than 
a generic player image.27  By using a celebrity’s image or identity, the 
creator of a new product can capitalize on a celebrity’s notoriety by 
leading the consumer to believe that the celebrity has endorsed the 
product.28 
Multiple rationales support the right of publicity’s protection of 
an individual’s interest in his or her own identity.29  These include: (1) 
a judgment of moral disapproval for the appropriation of another’s 
efforts, (2) an interest in the economic effect, and (3) an interest in 
protecting consumers from false advertisements of endorsement.30  
The moral rationale centers on societal disapproval for riding on the 
coattails of a celebrity’s “time, effort, skill, and even money.”31  Mean-
while, the economic rationale focuses on incentivizing individuals to 
“expend the time, effort and resources necessary to develop talents 
and produce works that ultimately benefit society as a whole.”32  Finally,  
 
 
 
 24  See K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the Right of 
Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 536–38 (2008). 
 25  Id. 
 26  See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) 
(noting that “ depictions of celebrities amounting to little more than the appropria-
tion of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected expression under the First 
Amendment”). 
 27  See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
 28  See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).  The same set of 
facts gave rise to both a Lanham Act claim under trademark law that the use of Rose 
Parks’ name created a potential for consumer confusion and a right of publicity claim 
for capitalizing on Rosa Parks’ name.  Id. at 446, 45961. 
 29  See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Prop-
erty and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 54 (1994). 
 30  Id. 
 31  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“No social 
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that 
would have market value and for which he would normally pay.”). 
 32  Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 206 (1993). 
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the consumer protection rationale is motivated by a desire to protect  
consumers from advertisers who falsely present their product as being 
endorsed by a particular celebrity.33 
A. Balancing the Right of Publicity with the First Amendment 
Though few courts have addressed the issue, the right of publicity 
often conflicts with the First Amendment.34  This conflict has arisen in 
disputes involving consumer products, such as trading cards,35 video-
games,36 art work,37 and comic books.38  Free speech is raised as an af-
firmative defense in these right of publicity suits.39  The First Amend-
ment protects speech from proscription by the government, yet, by 
granting the protection for the right of publicity, the government al-
lows the suppression of one individual’s speech in order to protect the 
rights of the other.40  This tension creates conflict between the rights. 
There is no question that videogames and similar entertainment 
constitute “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.41  The 
United States Supreme Court has determined that the First Amend-
ment protects “entertainment [including, but certainly not limited to,] 
motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live 
entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works.”42  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court has concluded that videogames are protected within 
the bounds of the First Amendment as they “communicate ideas—and 
even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as 
characters, dialogue, plot, and music), and through features distinctive 
to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual 
 
 33  See id. at 23132. 
 34  See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) 
(“Although surprisingly few courts have considered in any depth the means of recon-
ciling the right of publicity and the First Amendment, we follow those that have in 
concluding that depictions of celebrities amounting to little more than the appropri-
ation of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected expression under the First 
Amendment.”). 
 35  See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
 36  See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 37  See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918, 92425, 93738 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
 38  See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
 39  See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 810; DC Comics, 69 P.3d at 47778. 
 40  See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2002). 
 41  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).  
 42  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 14950 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Tacynec 
v. City of Phila., 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
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world).”43  Once it is established that a work, words, or conduct is 
“speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment, the next step is 
to determine how to balance the protection afforded by that Amend-
ment against competing interests.44 
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court 
examined the intersection of the First Amendment and right of pub-
licity in the context of a news broadcast of a performance at a fair.45  
Zacchini, a human cannonball, filed suit against a news network that 
broadcast the entirety of his performance.46  The Court determined 
that the news network’s conduct violated Zacchini’s right of publicity.47  
The Court recognized that the right of publicity was a property right, 
akin to that in intellectual property, stating that “the State’s interest in 
permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest 
of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”48  
The purpose of protecting the right of publicity, the Court reasoned, 
was to prevent unjust enrichment.49  The Court found that the goal of 
the right of publicity is “analogous to the goals of patent and copyright 
law” in that they serve to protect an individual’s ability to “reap the 
reward of his endeavors.”50  The Court stated that “[t]he economic phi-
losophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights” is that providing economic protection for the end-product 
encourages the effort to develop the talent, skill, or art.51  In its reason-
ing, the Court highlighted that the protection provided by the right of 
publicity—of the performer’s economic interests—provided an eco-
nomic incentive for the investment in the performance production, 
and that this was the same consideration of incentive for production 
underlying copyright law.52 
In ruling in favor of the human cannonball, the Court held that: 
[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be drawn be-
tween media reports that are protected and those that are 
not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s 
 
 43  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. 
 44  Hart, 717 F.3d at 150. 
 45  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 46  Id. at 563. 
 47  Id. at 565–66. 
 48  Id. at 573. 
 49  Id. at 576.  
 50  Id. at 573. 
 51  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Steins, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
 52  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
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entire act without his consent.  The Constitution no more pre-
vents a State from requiring respondent to compensate peti-
tioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would 
privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted 
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner.53 
According to the Court, ultimately, the harm done by the news broad-
cast, and the violation of the right of publicity, were economic disin-
centives for development of a skill.54  The human cannonball act “[was] 
the product of [Zacchini’s] own talents and energy, the end result of 
much time, effort, and expense.”55  The Court noted that if the public 
saw the newscast, allowing them to view the performance for free, then 
they would not pay to view that same performance.56  Accordingly, the 
Court held that the news broadcast deprived Zacchini of the economic 
value of his performance.57  Since then, three different tests have been 
used58 in attempting to find the appropriate balance between the right 
of publicity and the First Amendment: the predominant use test, the 
Rogers test, and the transformative use test. 
1.  The Predominant Use Test 
While not widely accepted, the predominant use test, which ap-
peared first in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, asks whether the predominant 
purpose of the work is commercial rather than expressive.59  If the pre-
dominant purpose is commercial, then the work is not protected by 
the First Amendment.60  Specifically, the test states that regardless of 
whether there is some expressive purpose of the work, if the product 
predominantly “exploits the commercial value of an individual’s iden-
tity,” it violates the right of publicity and is not protected by the First 
Amendment.61  By contrast, if the work is predominantly “an expressive 
comment on or about a celebrity” then it may be protected.62 
 
 
 53  Id. at 57475 (emphasis added). 
 54  Id. at 575.  
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 57576. 
 58  See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 
(Mo. 2003).  There is an additional smattering of cases that takes an ad hoc approach, 
which this Comment will not discuss.  
 59  See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 374 (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the 
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)). 
 62  Id. 
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2.  The Rogers Test 
The Rogers test, also referred to as the relatedness test or the re-
statement test, examines the relationship between the “celebrity image 
and work as a whole.”63  Originating in the trademark case of Rogers v. 
Grimaldi in the Second Circuit,64 the test asks whether the use of the 
celebrity’s name, or image, is “wholly unrelated” to the work.65  The 
Rogers court looked at a movie titled “Ginger and Fred,” in which the 
central characters were named “Ginger” and “Fred” after Ginger Rog-
ers and Fred Astaire.66  The Court concluded that “these names [were] 
not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value of their real life 
counterparts but instead [had] genuine relevance to the film’s story” 
and were, therefore, protected.67 
The Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers test in Parks v. LaFace Records.68  
In Parks, Rosa Parks, civil rights icon, brought suit against LaFace Rec-
ords, a record producer, and music duo OutKast for the use of her 
name as a song title on the album “Aquemini.”69  In determining 
whether OutKast’s right to free expression protected it from Rosa 
Parks’ claim of violation of the right of publicity, the Sixth Circuit first 
applied the Rogers test to determine the validity of Rosa Parks’ trade-
mark infringement claim.70  The Sixth Circuit found a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the use of Rosa Parks’ name “[was] artisti-
cally related to the content of the song or whether the use of the name 
Rosa Parks [was] nothing more than a misleading advertisement for 
the sale of the song.”71  Courts have been reluctant, however, to extend 
the Rogers test beyond consideration of the title of a work.72  One month 
after the Parks decision, the Sixth Circuit decided another right of pub-
licity case, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., using the transformative 
use test.73 
 
 63  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 64  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989); see infra Part III.B. (ex-
amining the balancing of the trademark intellectual property interest against freedom 
of expression). 
 65  Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. 
 66  Id. at 1001. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 69  Id. at 441–42. 
 70  Id. at 451. 
 71  Id. at 456. 
 72  Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 73  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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3.  The Transformative Use Test 
The final, and more widely accepted, approach taken in balancing 
the competing interests is the transformative use test.  In Comedy III 
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., a suit for copyright infringement 
brought against a rap music group, the California Supreme Court im-
ported the transformative use test from copyright law.74  According to 
the Comedy III court, “the inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than 
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative ele-
ments predominate in the work.”75  Ultimately, the transformative use 
test asks “whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so trans-
formed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression 
rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”76  Because the Court provided 
minimal guidance as to the correct interpretation of the “purpose and 
use” language, the transformative use test has been applied in multiple 
ways by multiple courts. 
In Winter v. DC Comics, the California Supreme Court applied the 
transformative use test to a case in which a comic book took the iden-
tifiable persona of the Winter brothers, singers Edgar and Johnny Win-
ter, and created the Autumn brothers, half-human, half-worm-like 
creatures.77  Expressing the test as requiring that “[a]n artist depicting 
a celebrity must contribute something more than a ‘merely trivial’ var-
iation [but must create] something recognizably ‘his own’ in order to 
qualify for legal protection,”78  the Winter court concluded that while 
the “fictional characters Johnny and Edgar Autumn [were] less-than-
subtle evocations of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books d[id] not de-
pict plaintiffs literally.”79  Furthermore, “the Autumn brothers [were] 
but cartoon characters – half-human and half-worm – in a larger story, 
which [wa]s itself quite expressive.”80  In this case, not only were the 
celebrity images placed in a new world, but the celebrities themselves 
were transformed into fantastical creatures. 
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the Sixth Circuit applied the 
transformative use test to a photograph of Tiger Woods within a col-
lage.81  The photograph itself was an un-transformed photograph of 
 
 74  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 75  Id. at 809. 
 76  Id. at 810. 
 77  Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477–78 (Cal. 2003). 
 78  Id.at 478 (citing Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d 797). 
 79  Id. at 479. 
 80  Id. 
 81  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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Woods.82  The ETW court, however, concluded that the collage in-
cluded significant transformative elements83 as it did not focus solely 
on Woods, but rather, “consist[ed] of a collage of images in addition 
to Wood’s image which [were] combined to describe, in artistic form, 
a historic event in sports history and to convey a message about the 
significance of Wood’s achievement in that event.”84  This application 
of the transformative use test focused on the entirety of the work in 
which the unaltered celebrity image was placed. 
In Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the California Court of Appeals 
applied the transformative use test in the context of videogames.85  The 
Kirby court concluded that Sega’s creation of the character of Ulala, 
while similar with respect to spoken phrases, clothing, and appearance 
to musician Kierin Kirby, was protected by the First Amendment be-
cause “Ulala was not a mere digital recreation of Kirby.”86  Instead, the 
creators used the celebrity image as fodder for the character creation.87  
This application of the transformative use test had elements of both an 
altered world and altered celebrity image. 
In No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., the Court of Appeal of 
California also examined the right to publicity within the videogame 
context, however, this time the application of the transformative use 
test yielded the conclusion that the work was not protected.88  The No 
Doubt court concluded that “no matter what else occurs in the game 
[Band Hero] during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars 
perform rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and 
maintains its fame.”89  No transformative elements were apparent in No 
Doubt as neither the environment in which the celebrity image was 
placed, nor the image itself, was altered.  Ultimately, however, few 
courts have directly addressed the appropriate way in which to balance 
the competing interests of the right of publicity and the First Amend-
ment.90 
 
 
 82  Id. at 938. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 86  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Kirby, 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 613). 
 87  Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 616. 
 88  No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011) 
 89  Id. at 41011. 
 90  See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001). 
HOLLOWS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  3:27 PM 
2015] COMMENT 295 
B. Right of Publicity Balancing in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit sought to reconcile 
the parties’ opposing interests in publicity and freedom of speech, and 
to determine the test most appropriate to be used in the future.91  After 
determining the proper test to be applied, the Hart court then ruled 
on the appropriate application of that test.92  The task of striking the 
appropriate balance between the interests at issue was made more dif-
ficult by the lack of applicable case law, as the right of publicity itself is 
relatively new. 
1. Background of Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 
Electronic Arts, Inc., founded in 1982, is “one of the world’s lead-
ing interactive entertainment software companies.”93  It “develops, pub-
lishes, and distributes interactive software worldwide” for consoles, cell 
phones, and PCs.94  After success in NFL football videogames, Elec-
tronic Arts created a college version, NCAA Football 2006.95  Largely 
based on realism, the NCAA Football franchise recreates sounds, game 
mechanics, and team mascots.96  The virtual teams are filled with ava-
tars resembling their real-life counterparts, including vital and bio-
graphical statistics.97 
From the 2002 season through the 2005 season, Ryan Hart wore 
number thirteen for the Rutgers Scarlet Knights, the Rutgers Univer-
sity National Collegiate Athletics Association (“NCAA”) Men’s Division 
I Football team.98  At six feet and two inches tall and weighing 197 
pounds, Ryan Hart held the position of starting quarterback, and still 
holds the school records for career attempts, completions, and inter-
ceptions.99  Accordingly, the Rutgers quarterback in NCAA Football 
2006, wears the number thirteen, is six feet and two inches tall, weighs 
 
 91  While the Tenth, Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all addressed the bal-
ance between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, neither the Third Cir-
cuit nor a New Jersey court has previously weighed in.  See Hilton v. Hallmark Cars, 599 
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
 92  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 93  Id. at 146. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Hart, 717 F.3d at 145. 
 99  Id. 
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197 pounds, and shares the same hometown and general physical fea-
tures with Ryan Hart.100  Notably, while appearance and statistics may 
be changed by the videogame player, the avatar’s home state, home 
town, team, and class year may not be altered.101 
Electronic Arts obtains licenses from the NCAA’s licensing agent, 
the Collegiate Licensing Company, that include “the right to use mem-
ber school names, team names, uniforms, logos, stadium fight songs, 
and other game elements.”102  Unlike other franchises, however, Elec-
tronic Arts does not obtain a license for the players’ likenesses and 
identities.103  This is likely due, in large part, to the NCAA rules that 
require all NCAA players to be “amateurs.”104  Under NCAA rules, in 
order to be eligible for intercollegiate athletics, the student-athlete 
must be considered an “amateur.”105  This means that the student may 
not take advantage of commercial opportunities, because amateur sta-
tus is lost if the athlete: (1) “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or 
indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport”106 or (2) “[a]ccepts any 
remuneration or permits the use of his or her name or picture to ad-
vertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commer-
cial product or service of any kind.”107  Accordingly, Ryan Hart and sim-
ilar college athletes would not be able to accept any form of payment 
or licensing agreement offered by Electronic Arts.108 
Additionally, the NCAA places an affirmative burden on the stu-
dent athletes to keep their names and images out of commercial use.109 
According to the NCAA manual, where a college athlete’s 
name or picture appears on commercial items . . . or is used 
to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or 
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or permis-
sion, the student athlete (or institution acting on behalf of 
the student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an 
activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for intercolle-
giate athletics.110 
 
 100  Id. at 146. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 146 n.5. 
 103  Id.  In its NFL series videogames, Electronic Arts pays for the right to use the 
professional football players’ likenesses.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 n.5. 
 104  NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.1.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at § 12.1.2. 
 107  Id. at § 12.5.2. 
 108  See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146. 
 109  NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL at § 12.5.2.2. 
 110  Id. 
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This rule provided further incentive for Ryan Hart to seek to prevent 
Electronic Arts from commercially benefiting from his image. 
Ryan Hart brought suit against Electronic Arts, alleging that the 
clearly identifiable use of his likeness in the game violated his right of 
publicity.111  For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, Elec-
tronic Arts conceded that it had violated Hart’s right of publicity 
through the use of his image and personal characteristics in the 2004, 
2005, and 2006 NCAA Football video games.112  Electronic Arts con-
tended, however, that it was entitled to summary judgment on First 
Amendment grounds.113 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Elec-
tronic Arts, holding that the game, NCAA Football, was entitled to First 
Amendment protection and therefore was “shielded from right of pub-
licity claims by the First Amendment.”114  Hart appealed and the major-
ity of the Third Circuit held in his favor.115 
2. Determinations of the Majority 
Acknowledging that courts have different balancing approaches 
in addressing the tension between free expression and protecting the 
right of publicity, the majority noted that it must first look at the inter-
ests that need to be balanced, then consider the different approaches 
taken by courts “to resolv[e] the tension between the First Amendment 
and the right of publicity.”116  To determine “whether the interest in 
safeguarding the right of publicity overpowers the interest in safe-
guarding free expression,”117 the majority looked at the predominant 
use test and the Rogers test before deciding that application of the trans-
formative use test best balances publicity and free speech.118 
The Hart court rejected the predominant use test as “subjective at 
best and arbitrary at worst.”119  According to the court, application 
would require the judge to act as both impartial jurist and discerning 
art critic.120  Furthermore, adoption of the predominant use test, the  
 
 
 111  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011). 
 112  Id. at 766. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 115  See id. at 145. 
 116  Id. at 149. 
 117  Id. at 150. 
 118  See id. at 15363. 
 119  Id. at 154. 
 120  Hart, 717 F.3d. at 154. 
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Hart court explained, would “suppose that there exists a broad range 
of seemingly expressive speech that has no First Amendment Value.”121 
The Hart court then found the Rogers test unsuitable here because 
it is not carefully calibrated to balance two fundamental protections: 
“the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and 
profit from one’s own identity.”122  The court indicated that application 
of the test would yield nonsensical results.  The court explained that 
because Ryan Hart was a college football player, his likeness is, as a 
matter of course, related to NCAA Football.123  Because the game and his 
celebrity are related, the game is not a commercial advertisement for 
some unrelated product.  Accordingly, Hart would fail the Rogers test.124  
This outcome, however, was unacceptable because “[i]t [could not] be 
that the very activity by which Appellant achieved his renown now pre-
vents him from protecting his hard-won celebrity.”125 
Ultimately accepting the transformative use test, the Hart court 
explained that a balance can be struck between a celebrity’s right to 
profit from his image and the value of the new expressive work by look-
ing at the “the purpose and character of the use.”126  If the work con-
tains “significant transformative elements,” the court reasoned, it is 
“less likely to interfere with the economic interests implicated by the 
right of publicity.”127  In applying the test, the Hart majority concluded 
that, like in No Doubt, the digital avatar mirrored the real Ryan Hart: 
they both play football in college football stadiums, “filled with all the 
trappings of a college football game.  This is not transformative; vari-
ous digitized sights and sounds . . . do not alter or transform the 
[player]’s identity in a significant way.”128 
In applying the transformative use test to Hart, the court found 
that it must focus on “the specific aspects of the work that speak to 
whether it was merely created to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.”129  The 
court noted that the avatar matches Hart in hair color and style, skin 
tone, and accessories worn.  It also mirrors Hart’s vital and biograph-
ical statistics.130  The court then noted that in order to find some trans-
formative element, it “must look somewhere other than just the in-
 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. at 157. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. at 158. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
 127  Hart, 717 F.3d at 159. 
 128  Id. at 166. 
 129  Id. at 163. 
 130  Id.at 166. 
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game digital recreation.”131  The court stated that it must look at con-
text, but dismissed Electronic Arts’ suggestion that other creative ele-
ments in the game are so numerous as to render the work transforma-
tive.132  The court stated that “[d]ecisions applying the [t]ransformative 
[u]se [t]est invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is 
altered by other aspects of the work.  Wholly unrelated elements do 
not bear on this inquiry.”133  The majority’s analysis of whether or not 
the videogame was transformative focused closely on the image of Ryan 
Hart himself, looking at that specific aspect of the game. 
3. Judge Ambro’s Dissenting Application of the 
Transformative Use Test 
In his dissent, Judge Ambro agreed that the transformative use 
test was the operative test to balance publicity and free speech, but 
concluded that the work must be looked at as a whole rather than as 
the use of the individual by itself.134  He stated that “[t]o determine 
whether an individual’s identity has been ‘transformed’ for purposes 
of the Transformative Use Test, I believe it is necessary to review the 
likeness in the context of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing 
only on the individual’s likeness.”135 
Judge Ambro explained that application of the test to the work as 
a whole is consistent with the application taken by the architect of the 
transformative use test, the California Supreme Court.136  Furthermore, 
the dissent compared application of transformative use in publicity to 
the way it is applied in books and art, stating that the test “must mesh 
with existing constitutional protections for works of expression.”137  
The Winter court emphasized that the comic contains “significant ex-
pressive content other than plaintiffs’ mere likeness” and noted that 
the characters are placed within a larger story, “which is itself quite 
 
 131  Id.  
 132  Id. at 166–67. 
 133  Hart, 717 F.3d at 169.  
 134  See id. at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 135  Id. 
 136  See id. 
 137  Id. (citing Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); Ruffin-Stein-
beck v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp.2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) in support of the conclusion that constitutional protection cannot be dimin-
ished simply “because a celebrity’s name or likeness was used to increase a product’s 
value and marketability”). 
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expressive.”138  ETW featured a photograph of Tiger Woods.139  The ac-
tual image of Woods had not been altered at all, but rather, the major-
ity noted that it received protection because “the collage ‘contain[ed] 
significant transformative elements.’”140 
Concluding that Electronic Arts’ use of realistic avatars merited 
First Amendment protection, the dissent noted the “myriad of original 
graphics, videos, sound effects, and game scenarios,” which allow a 
user to either dictate the play of a college team or create an entirely 
new team.141  Judge Ambro reasoned that attempting to separate Hart’s 
image from the creative elements of the game as a whole “disregards 
NCAA Football’s many expressive features beyond an avatar having char-
acteristics similar to Hart.”142  Further, “[h]is likeness is transformed by 
the artistry necessary to create a digitally rendered avatar within the 
imaginative and interactive world EA has placed that avatar.”143 
III. BALANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTERESTS AGAINST FREE 
EXPRESSION 
The same tension, between an intellectual property interest and 
free expression, arises under copyright and trademark law and is set-
tled by way of internal doctrinal mechanisms.144  While the doctrine of 
these intellectual property categories seeks to balance precisely the 
same tension, they have developed in different ways with different 
checks, values, concerns, and considerations.145  Nonetheless, the bal-
ancing of these developed intellectual property doctrines may yield val-
uable insight and consideration for the balancing undertaken in the 
right of publicity context. 
 
 
 
 138  Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
 139  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 140  Hart, 717 F.3d at 173. 
 141  Id. at 175. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. 
 144  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 7. 
 145  See Kwall, supra note 29, at 58.  Kwall explains that while copyright law and the 
right of publicity may be analogous, they are different both in their “theoretical un-
derpinnings and objectives.  Thus, the incorporation of a copyright law doctrine as the 
springboard for analysis in the First Amendment/right of publicity dilemma will result 
in the adoption of an imprecise analytical framework and potentially inappropriate 
outcomes.” 
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A. Copyright Law 
The purpose of copyright is to promote both the creation and 
publication of expression, just as the purpose of the right of publicity 
is to promote investment in development of a skill.146  The Supreme 
Court explains that “[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create 
and disseminate ideas.”147 Multiple elements of the fair use defense 
look at the economic nature and impact of the new work in compari-
son with the original.148 
Copyright law is firmly rooted in statutory construction and has a 
long precedential history.149  The Supreme Court has determined that 
any tension between the First Amendment and copyright law has been 
addressed by the two limitations placed on copyright: (1) the idea ver-
sus expression dichotomy and (2) the fair use defense.150  The idea ver-
sus expression dichotomy states that the “idea” giving rise to the work 
is part of the public domain while the “expression” produced by the 
individual is protected by copyright.151  Accordingly, it is only the ex-
pression itself that is protected.152  In order for there to be a copyright 
infringement, the work must be deemed “expression.”153  The fair use 
defense is a determination that a use of a work is not an infringement 
on the copyright.154  The fair use defense, codified in section 107 of the 
1976 Copyright Act, requires the evaluation of: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of commercial nature . . . ; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.155 
The elements provide guidance from which the court can make the 
determination that the use of the original work in the new work is 
 
 146  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 147  Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985)). 
 148  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).   
 149  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1113. 
 150  Id. at 12. 
 151  Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 
321, 323 (1989). 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. at 324. 
 154  Michael J. Madison, A Pattern Oriented Approach to Fair-Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525, 1554 (2004). 
 155  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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“fair,” meaning that it is not an infringement.156  The determination 
involves consideration not only of “the purpose and character of the 
use” from which the transformative use test is derived,157 but also 
whether the use is of a commercial nature for economic gain.158  The 
second element considers the nature of the work, whether it is com-
mercial, educational, or instructional.159  The third element looks at 
how much of the original work has been incorporated into the new 
work in question, while the fourth factor explicitly inquires into the 
market impact of the appropriation.160  Additionally, distinctions may 
be drawn between commercial and noncommercial use,161 transforma-
tive and non-transformative use,162 and productive and non-productive 
use, all of which increase the difficulty of the fair use determination.163 
Recent court discourse has seen an increase in the discussion of 
transformative use,164 embodied in the first half of the first factor of the 
fair use defense.165  For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.,166 
in which the owner of a rock ballad sued a rap music group for copy-
right infringement, the court cited with approval Judge Pierre Leval’s 
article Toward a Fair Use Standard,167 which supports increased attention 
to transformative use within the fair use test as providing broader pro-
tection for First Amendment interests.168 
The Supreme Court has found that copyright’s built-in free 
speech safeguards are “generally adequate,”169 and has expressed con-
fidence in copyright’s internal checks addressing issues of free speech, 
rather than constitutional scrutiny.170  The critique of copyright juris-
 
 156  Madison, supra note 154, at 1558. 
 157  See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 15960 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining the 
development of the transformative use test in Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, 
Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)). 
 158  See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 159  See id. 
 160  See id. 
 161  Madison, supra note 154, at 1558 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 45051 (1984)). 
 162  Madison, supra note 154, at 1558 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 163  Madison, supra note 154, at 155859.  
 164  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 12–13. 
 165  Id. at 13. 
 166  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 167  Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 168  See Bartholomew and Tehranian, supra note 12, at 13. 
 169  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
 170  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 89091 (2012). 
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prudence is that it is a test of necessity and that the original copy-
righted work must be intrinsic to the new work’s message in order for 
the new work to be allowed.171  The fact remains, however, that the “fair 
use” defense is relatively broad, providing protection for not only the 
use of facts and ideas, but also, in certain circumstances, the expression 
contained in the copyrighted work.172  Copyrighted work can be cop-
ied, without violation, for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search . . . .”173  In fact, according to the Supreme Court, copyright’s 
fair use defense provides “latitude for scholarship and comment,”174 
“and even for parody.”175 
B. Trademark Law 
Just as the right of publicity and copyright law emphasize eco-
nomic interests, trademark law, too, seeks to promote economic effi-
ciency.  Trademark law focuses on minimizing the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion in the marketplace, thereby promoting economic 
efficiency.  As professors Mark Bartholomew and John Tehranian 
stated, in their comprehensive comparison of intellectual property 
frameworks, “[t]he promotion of economic efficiency serves as the 
dominant rationale for trademark rights and is achieved by minimizing 
the likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace.”176  Unlike 
the right of publicity, trademark law implicates the potential for con-
sumer confusion.177  In contrast to copyright’s strict historical tradition, 
trademark law has been more flexible, sometimes allowing for the pro-
duction of new doctrine to accommodate speech.178  But trademark law 
is similar to copyright law in its reliance on internal mechanisms to 
address issues of free expression.179  The new mechanisms for infringe-
ment evaluation, however, are then placed within the traditional view 
 
 171  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 13 (discussing the difference 
between protected parody and unprotected satire). 
 172  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
 173  Id. at 21920 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(2012)). 
 174  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 175  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994) (holding that a rap group’s musical parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” may be fair use)). 
 176  Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 41.  See Mark Bartholomew, Making 
a Mark in the Internet Economy: A Trademark Analysis of Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA. 
L. REV. 179, 19596 (2005); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
1601, 161415 (2010). 
 177  See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 178  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 7981. 
 179  Id. at 41. 
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of the purpose of trademark law, effectively narrowing their interpre-
tation.180  Recent court decisions have occasionally directly addressed 
First Amendment issues.181 
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court developed a new test to determine 
trademark infringement.182  While, as discussed supra, the Rogers test 
was later appropriated for use in the right of publicity context, it orig-
inally developed within the trademark framework.183  Within trademark 
law, prior tests had simply asked whether the title was likely to confuse 
consumers, or whether the filmmaker could have made his or her 
point in other ways.184  The new test asks whether “the title has no artis-
tic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some ar-
tistic relevance, [whether] the title explicitly misleads as to the source 
or content of the work.”185 
Generally, two questions are asked under the Rogers test: “(1) 
whether use of the plaintiff’s trademark is ‘artistically relevant’ to the 
defendant’s work; and (2) whether use of the plaintiff’s trademark is 
‘explicitly misleading.’”186  Artistic relevance is interpreted broadly, 
with deference given to the defendant.187  The phrase “explicitly mis-
leading” is taken to mean that “defendant’s work must make some af-
firmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement be-
yond the mere use of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic.”188  
Keeping the burden on the plaintiff and requiring an additional af-
firmative statement by the defendant renders the Rogers test particu-
larly protective of speech.189 
Trademark law, however, also requires consideration of the dis-
tinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.190  This lim-
its the availability of a First Amendment defense to a trademark in-
fringement claim.  In Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., the Third Circuit 
 
 180  See id. 
 181  See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 127679 
(11th Cir. 2012); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 31314 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 182  See Rogers, 875 F.2d 994. 
 183  For a discussion of how this test was later borrowed for use in the right of pub-
licity context as in Parks v. LaFace, see supra Part II.A.2. 
 184  Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 48. 
 185  Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
 186  Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 49 (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 187  Id. 
 188  Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 1:09–cv–1236, 2011 WL 2457678, at *6 
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001; E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 
1101). 
 189  Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 50. 
 190  See id. at 52. 
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determined that where the defendant’s use of a mark is commercial 
speech, there is no First Amendment defense.191  In trademark law, 
once an activity is considered commercial, the violation is evaluated 
within trademark law’s own framework and is no longer considered to 
directly implicate the First Amendment.192 
IV. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE BALANCING SCHEME 
From the first case addressing the right of publicity, the Supreme 
Court noted that the right of publicity was a property right akin to that 
in intellectual property; the Court found that the goal of the right of 
publicity is “analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,” in that 
they serve to protect an individual’s ability to “reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”193  In the most recent case addressing the right of publicity 
and the First Amendment, , Judge Ambro stated for the Third Circuit 
that the “[t]ransformative use [test] must mesh with existing constitu-
tional protections for works of expression.”194  Examining the work of 
previous decisions in various courts, the Third Circuit attempted to de-
termine the appropriate test and interpretation.195  Settling on the 
transformative use test, the majority in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. ap-
plied a narrow interpretation to the requirement of transformation, 
concluding that the First Amendment did not protect the defendant 
from its admitted violation of the right of publicity.196 
This narrow reading is commensurate with the balancing under-
taken in both copyright and trademark law.  Recognized by the Su-
preme Court as employing adequate balancing of interests, the frame-
work employed in copyright recognizes both the interest in free 
expression of the defendant and the economic interests of the prop-
erty protection.197  While the Third Circuit’s ultimate determination 
echoed the narrow free expression exception to copyright violations, 
the analysis that the court employed did not reference the strong eco-
nomic considerations underpinning not only the right of publicity, but 
also copyright and trademark law.198  In order to adequately balance  
 
 
 
 191  Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 192  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 80. 
 193  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).  
 194  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 195  See id. at 153161. 
 196  Id. at 169. 
 197  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
 198  Cf. Hart, 717 F.3d at 163166. 
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the competing interests of the right of publicity and free expression, 
the commercial interests at play should be recognized just as they are 
in copyright and trademark law. 
In contrast to copyright’s rigid framework, the right of publicity’s 
single factor test, looking at the degree of transformation of the celeb-
rity, is exceedingly flexible.199  But this flexibility allows the transform-
ative use test to be attuned to the tension of interests between the prop-
erty holder, the celebrity, and the speaker.  The flexibility also allows 
the right of publicity to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with 
the other intellectual properties200 to account for their balancing of 
parallel interests.201 
The balance between the right of publicity and the First Amend-
ment must be carefully calibrated because “the very importance of ce-
lebrities in society means that the right of publicity has the potential of 
censoring significant expression by suppressing alternative versions of 
celebrity images that are iconoclastic, irreverent or otherwise attempt 
to redefine the celebrity’s meaning.”202  The Supreme Court, however, 
has found that copyright law’s built-in free speech safeguards are “gen-
erally adequate,”203 and expressed confidence in copyright law’s inter-
nal checks addressing issues of free speech, rather than constitutional 
scrutiny.204 
The transformative use test is derived from the first prong of cop-
yright’s fair use test.205  The interests and incentives that frame the con-
struction of copyright law should therefore be reflected in the under-
standing of the right of publicity.  The underlying economic incentive 
for the protection of the right of publicity is for the individual to make 
“the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the 
public.”206  The same interest underlies copyright law since a copy-
right’s purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free ex-
pression: “The Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of 
free expression.  By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s 
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
 
 199  See supra Part II.A.3. 
 200  Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 201  See supra notes 197–198. 
 202  Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001). 
 203  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
 204  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 89091 (2012). 
 205  Id.; see17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 206  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
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disseminate ideas.”207  Accordingly, the interpretation of the transform-
ative use test should mirror the balancing undertaken in the copyright 
and trademark context, as they are protecting the same interests. 
Copyright law places primary importance on “protecting a plain-
tiff’s right to exploit potential licensing markets, even in the face of a 
First Amendment defense.”208  Multiple elements of the fair use defense 
look at the economic nature and impact of the new work in compari-
son with the original.209  In the scheme of copyright, market concerns 
take center stage.  Half of the fair use defense explicitly evaluates eco-
nomic considerations: “the purpose and character of the use, includ-
ing whether such use is of commercial nature,” and “the effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”210 
Trademark law similarly emphasizes commercial concerns be-
cause the main inquiry seeks to protect business identity and asks 
whether a consumer may be confused by the use of the mark.211  “The 
promotion of economic efficiency serves as the dominant rationale for 
trademark rights and is achieved by minimizing the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion in the marketplace.”212  Trademark law looks at the 
specific mark by itself, similar to the majority’s focus on the specific use 
of the celebrity image, and asks whether there would be consumer con-
fusion213—whether a consumer would think that the new work is con-
nected with the familiar brand holding that mark.  Similarly, in the 
right of publicity context, application of the consumer confusion prin-
ciple would yield the question of whether there would be confusion 
that the celebrity endorsed the new work.  In other words, the court 
should consider whether use of the celebrity image in the new work is 
so unaltered, untransformed, and recognizable as to cause the audi-
ence to believe that the celebrity himself is connected to the new work.  
Direct consideration of the economic interests, as in trademark law, 
would ensure that the understanding and application of transforma-
tive use clearly addresses the economic interest grounding the right of 
publicity. 
 
 
 
 207  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
 208  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 21. 
 209  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
 210  Id. 
 211  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 80. 
 212  Id.  See also Bartholomew, supra note 176, at 195–96; Katyal, supra note 176, at 
1614–15. 
 213  Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 41. 
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The centrality of the economic interest in the right of publicity, 
or in this case, the economic effect of the use of a celebrity’s image or 
identity, is important to consider as part of the balancing of property 
and free speech interests.214  It is one of the three rationales providing 
a base for the protection of the right of publicity, and scholars have 
argued that the central reason for protection of the right of publicity 
is to preserve a celebrity’s right to commercial gain from their own 
person.215  In Zacchini, the Supreme Court approved of the right of pub-
licity as an economic incentive for individuals to develop a perfor-
mance or persona.216  The centrality of economics to both the reason-
ing behind the right of publicity and the analysis applied in other 
intellectual property doctrines indicates that commercial gain should 
be factored into the considerations in balancing the breach of right of 
publicity and the interests of the First Amendment.  While economics 
is not the only consideration for the right of publicity, in contrast to 
trademark law, and it is not even explicitly part of the test, in contrast 
to copyright law, it is part of the larger scheme of intellectual property 
in which the right of publicity is placed.217  Accordingly, the critiques 
and understandings of these developed intellectual property doctrines 
may yield valuable insight and consideration for developing the appro-
priate balancing in the right of publicity context. 
Despite the extensive similarities between the right of publicity, 
copyright law, and trademark law, the right of publicity lacks the his-
tory of statutory construction of trademark and copyright law.218 This 
difference allows right of publicity discourse to be receptive to the de-
velopment of an interpretation similar to the other intellectual prop-
erties.219  This means that the right of publicity, and the transformative 
use test specifically, is left with a great deal of vagueness in how it is to 
be properly applied; at the same time, there is flexibility within looking 
at the “purpose and use” to apply the transformative use test so that it 
 
 214  See Kwall, supra note 29, at 55. 
 215  See id. The labor and unjust enrichment justifications focus on taking away or 
denying the celebrity economic gain earned from his persona.  Critics, however, argue 
that these justifications are overstated as the individual would have no earning poten-
tial without the media, audience, and culture of celebrity creating a marketable iden-
tity.  Id. 
 216  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575576 (1977). 
 217  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 3. 
 218  See id. at 8. 
 219  See id. 
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is consistent with the balancing undertaken in copyright and trade-
mark law.220  Accordingly, the transformative use test may be read nar-
rowly to directly account for the economic interests at the heart of in-
tellectual property. 
Ultimately, though approaching the economic interests indi-
rectly, the Hart majority decided that if the work contains “significant 
transformative elements . . . it is less likely to interfere with the eco-
nomic interests implicated by the right of publicity.”221  This interpre-
tation provides a narrow First Amendment exception to right of pub-
licity infringement that is consistent with the understanding that the 
right of publicity is similar to copyright.222  Copyright law places pri-
mary importance on “protecting a plaintiff’s right to exploit potential 
licensing markets, even in the face of a First Amendment defense.”223  
It is also consistent with the underlying interest in protecting the eco-
nomic incentive to develop a skill or identity that undergirds both the 
right of publicity and copyright: as “[t]he Framers intended copyright 
itself to be the engine of free expression.  By establishing a marketable 
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas”224 and the “same considera-
tion underlies . . . copyright laws long enforced by [the Supreme] 
Court.”225  Therefore, the interpretation of the transformative use test 
as applied by the Hart majority should be adopted in the right of pub-
licity context, with the additional understanding of the prominence 
that economic interests play in the intellectual property balancing 
scheme. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The right of publicity does not have a great deal of precedent de-
fining its interpretation and scope.  This lack of history provides flexi-
bility in determining the appropriate way in which to balance the com-
peting issues: the right of publicity’s property interest versus the First 
 
 220  See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing different courts’ applications of “purpose and 
use” within the transformative use test). 
 221  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 222  See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) 
(“Although surprisingly few courts have considered in any depth the means of recon-
ciling the right of publicity and the First Amendment, we follow those that have in 
concluding that depictions of celebrities amounting to little more than the appropri-
ation of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected expression under the First 
Amendment.”). 
 223  See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 21. 
 224  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
 225  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
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Amendment free expression.  Despite the right of publicity’s lack of 
precedent, however, both copyright and trademark law have fully de-
veloped frameworks that balance identical interests.  Accordingly, the 
affirmative defense of free expression for a violation of the right of 
publicity should be narrowly available, as provided by the majority in 
Hart, to echo its availability in the other areas of intellectual property.  
Additionally, attention should be paid to the strong economic interests 
at stake, which the intellectual property schemes seek to protect. 
 
